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The first use of the modern day attack drone by the United States was in Afghanistan in 
mid 2002, and for the past 11 years attack drones have been used by the United States in as many 
countries as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. When considering the alternatives to using drones, 
such as sending marines on the ground to complete a mission or flying a piloted jet over enemy 
territory to gather intelligence, as well as the military power that the use of these vehicles 
projects, the attack drone has become the weapon of choice in the war on terror for both the Bush 
and the Obama administrations. The continuous use of these attack drones for the past 11 years 
can be defined as the Bush-Obama drone doctrine, a doctrine that has become an important part 
of US foreign policy, and thus, has had international repercussions. To explore and examine 
these international repercussions, and apply the lessons learned from reoccurring drone strikes in 
Pakistan, is the purpose of this paper.  
 
As pilotless drone attacks are a relatively new phenomena, the topic of drone attacks and 
reviews of the drone doctrine are relatively new to the academic community. That being said, 
there have been several important works discussing the legality and morality of the drone 
policy.1 Yet, the majority of works, including the aforementioned, have analyzed the policy 
either from a United States domestic perspective, a bilateral perspective between a state and a 
transnational non-state actor, or by case study. In sum, there has been little work in the academic 
field addressing the drone policy from a truly international perspective.  
 
This paper approaches the Drone Doctrine from an international perspective, and does so 
by incorporating several international legal principles and customary norms, the reports and 
statements of international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross 
and the United Nations High Commission of Human Rights, as well as present and past members 
from these organizations, and other experts and scholars across the international community. The 
Drone Doctrine itself is an international policy, affecting the whole international community, and 








 As a member of the college democrats at my home university, and a ranking member in 
our school’s debate team, I had the distinct opportunity to work with many intelligent and 
interesting people from all across the country, and I became very close with the professor who is 
the faculty advisor for the debate team. One of the things he mentioned to while we were talking 
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 See Daniel Statman’s essay Can Just War Theory Justify Targeted Killing?, Jeff McMahan’s essay Targeted 
Killing: Murder, Combat or Law Enforcement?, and Andre Altman’s book Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in 
an Asymmetrical World. 
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one time was the US use of drones in war. I had never heard of this before, and the idea, novel as 
it was, appealed to me. He showed me a page on the New York Times website that was a debate 
board, where an individual from anywhere in the world could post their arguments for or against 
the US’ use of drones. I read this almost religiously and began to read many publications about 
drones and realized the importance of this topic. 
 That was really what initially sparked my own personal interest in attack drones. Upon 
deciding to come and study in Geneva, I knew that there would opportunities to speak with 
experts all across the field of international relations, but I had initially wanted to explore this 
issue of drones from the private sector. In other words, I wanted to understand the relationship 
between private drone contractors and governments in the United States and why it is important 
to understand that relationship. To this point I reached out to several military contractors not only 
within Geneva but across Europe. I waited two weeks and received 0 replies. Contemplating the 
difficulties of talking to people in the private sector, I readjusted the perspective of my paper to 
that of international public law and customary norms; namely IHL and IHRL. I quickly found 
that there are a plethora of experts working on those topics here in Geneva, especially in the 
ICRC and the UNHCHR.  
Upon further reviewing the literature involving drones, I found myself continuously 
reading similar arguments, and they all shared one thing in common: regardless of their ethical or 
legal conclusions, they were considering a hypothetical drone strike, an isolated occurrence, one 
that hasn’t occurred yet. This was befuddling to me, for we now have 11 years of empirical data 
on which we can evaluate strikes that have already happened. To this point, I had initially wanted 
to empirically analyze the effects and consequences of drone attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Yemen and Somalia, but I quickly found, that due to the very limited information available about 
strikes in these countries, and given the purpose of this paper, that would be impossible. I was 
able to meet with an expert in Pakistan-American relations, and concluded that it would be more 
realistic to focus on one country in particular, Pakistan, rather than trying to include all the 
countries.Thus, this is why the report is focusing on Pakistan. 
Finally, this paper confronts the moral and legal crisis that is happening in Pakistan right 
now through a human lens and a legal lens. I remember very early on in the course of this report 
reflecting on the age old proverb: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” And 
when I began researching the effects and consequences of the doctrine, I began to think: what if 
5 
Pakistan was doing what America is doing in their country in our country? What if the Pakistani 
government had a drone doctrine it has been applying for 11 years in America? What if, despite 
the public outcry, our government was incapable or unwilling of stopping this? These questions 
made me ask if any country in the world should be able to depart from the laws of combat, if any 
country in the world should be able to disregard the principles of sovereignty and neutrality, or if 
country in the world should be allowed to undermine IHL and IHRL customary norms, for, are 
not all countries equal under the law? These questions are what guide this paper throughout. 
Moreover, it is important to note where the empirical evidence that is going to support 
my claim comes from. There are many different places that one can find statistics on drone 
strikes. Yet, after review of much of the the literature, I noticed that many journals used the 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism. I searched further and concluded that this was the most 
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I. Introduction  
“Do the United States and its people really want to tell those of us who live in the rest of the world that President 
Obama can sign off on a decision to kill us with less worry about judicial scrutiny than if the target is an American? 
Would your Supreme Court really want to tell humankind that we, like the slave Dred Scott in the 19th century, are 
not as human as you are? ” 




“I think its a good program and I don’t disagree with the basic policy that the Obama administration is pursuing 
now in that regards.”  




Through the 20th and 21st centuries, the nature of war has changed dramatically. As the 
nature of war changed, the people affected by wars changed; shifting from primarily soldiers and 
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armed combatants to innocent civilians and children.4 In a new battlefield, a new weapon, the 
attack drone, has contributed to the changing nature of warfare because the people that it 
impacts, excessively, are civilians and children. As such, the evolved attack drones are 
effectively weapons of war; that, in present times, are being used by the United States 
government to carry out extrajudicial assassinations of high value military targets all over the 
world.  
To this point, this paper is comprehensive. It examines the Drone Doctrine through an 
international legal lens and demonstrates the doctrine has been inconsistent with principles of the 
law of armed conflict and IHL and IHRL customary norms. It documents the effects of the 
doctrine through a human lens by magnifying the consequences on innocent and unarmed 
civilians in the nation of Pakistan, and indicates, through empirical evidence, that the innocence 
lost has outweighed the benefits gained. It authenticates the claim that the drone doctrine in it of 
itself is counterproductive to US strategic and military interests. And finally, it calls on the US to 
be more accountable in its application of the doctrine, severely limit the amount of drone attacks 
in the future, and make changes and adjustments to the Drone Doctrine that are more respective 
of the fundamental and most basic rights international law protects. 
II:  The Evolution of Pilotless Flying Aircrafts and the 
Development of Attack Drones  
2.0 Introduction 
 This section explores the evolution of pilotless flying vehicles to the development of 
modern day attack drones. This is important to note because it is demonstrates that pilotless 
flying vehicles were born out of war and were to be used in war. Even since the first 
manifestation of this idea into a reality, these have been weapons of war. The historical relevance 
of this section is that it provides a lens through which to view present day drone attacks. 
2.1 Balloons Over Venice 
The military practice of using drones in war is not new. It traces its lineage all the way back to the 
19th century.
5 In August of 1849, the then mighty Austrian empire, already in control of much of 
modern day Italy, set its sights on conquering the city of Venice. Austrian artillery general and 
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 International Committee for the Red Cross. “A Brief Introduction to International Humanitarian Law.” ICRC 
Headquarters. School for International Training. Lecture. Geneva, Switzerland. 26 February 2013.  
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 Veuthey, Michael. Personal Interview.April 29 2013. WMO headquarters. Geneva, Switzerland.  
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famed inventor, Franz von Uchatius, realized, that when considering the topography and 
geography of the city of Venice, laying a siege on the city would be particularly difficult and cost 
too much; miltarality and fiscally.6 As necessity is the mother of invention, Uchatius had an 
innovative solution: use unmanned balloons to remotely fly over the city and bombard the 
enemy7, thereby minimizing Austrian losses while maximizing Venicean losses. The Scientific 
American reported Uchatius’ plans in March of 1849:   
 
"Venice is to bombarded by five balloons, each twenty-three feet in diameter. . . in a favorable wind, and 
the balloons will be launched and directed as near to Venice as possible, and on their being brought to 
vertical positions over the town, they will be fired by electro magnetism by means of a long isolated copper 
wire. . . the bomb falls perpendicularly, and explodes on reaching the ground.
8" 
 
Unfortunately, an unexpected shift of the wind drove some of the balloons back to the Austrian 
camp, and consequently, after that, their use was abandoned.9 Despite the failure, this event is 
important because it marked for the first time in recorded history the use of unmanned flying 
vessels as a weapon in war, and the idea lived on, for once winged aircraft was invented, using 
unmanned winged aircraft for military purposes would soon follow, and eventually be realized.  
 
2.2 Target Practice  
After the first successful wireless transmission in 1896 and then the first successful flight 
of the airplane in 1908, the idea of developing unmanned aircraft, and then, subsequently, using 
the aircraft in war, was reborn. Although dramatically different than flying balloons, with the 
outset of the first World War reaching the United States in 1916, inventors, scientists and 
military men all over the country revisited the idea of pilotless bombing machines. On 
September 12, 1916, the Hewitt-Sperry Automatic Airplane, or the "flying bomb," made its first 
successful flight, demonstrating that the once abstract idea was now a palpable reality.10 One 
year later, in November of 1917, after news of this flying bomb gained media attention, it was 
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 McDaid Hugh and Barton Strong. "Remote Piloted Aerial Vehicles: An Anthology."RPAV: Remote Piloted Aerial 
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Systems Command, 04 September 2004. 
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flown for representatives of the United States army.11 Intrigued at the technological 
sophistication of this machine, and contemplating the military advantage to be gained from it, the 
army of the United States commissioned these scientists to build an “aerial torpedo,”12 which 
resulted in the Kettering Bug-the earliest predecessor to present day cruise missiles.13 Although 
the Kettering Bug was successfully flown and capable of striking ground targets up to 75 miles 
away, it was not completed until after the first World War was already over14, and thus never 
saw the field of battle.  
During the years between the interwar period, the British and American governments 
continued to show interest in developing pilotless target aircraft.15 But it wasn’t until the 
outbreak of the Second World War that unmanned aircrafts would be produced on a mass scale. 
Originally from Great Britain, Reginald Denny, an inventor and a scientist, moved to the United 
States during the 1930’s and created an initial, low cost remote control aircraft. Successively, he 
and his partners started a business which would eventually become “Radioplane Company,” and 
spent 10 years adjusting and correcting his original prototypes. Eventually in 1940, after a 
successful demonstration of the flying aircraft to the US army, Denny and his company were 
awarded a bountiful contract with the United States army to produce remote controlled airplanes 
that would be used in target practice for anti aircraft weapons.16 Indeed, throughout the Second 
World War, Denny and his company produced nearly fifteen thousand drones that were 
purchased by the United States army.17 The creation of these remote controlled flying machines, 
coined as “Dennymites,” and the purchasing of the invention by a public entity, in this case the 
United States army,18 represents the important and intricate relationship between private 
individuals and private military manufacturers and governments, a reality, which, like remote 
controlled flying bombers, would continue to evolve and develop alongside history. 








 Cornelisse, Diana G. Splendid Vision, Unswerving Purpose: Developing Air Power for the United States Air 
Force During the First Century of Powered Flight. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio: U.S. Air Force 
Publications, 2002. 
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  Donald, David, edition 12. Encyclopedia of World Aircraft, Chapter 36: Standard Aircraft. Etobicoke, Ontario. 
Prospero Books, 1997, pg.854. 
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2.3 Reconnaisse Drones  
As the Second World War officially 
ended in late 1945, the United States’ strategic focus in the world shifted; and so did the strategic 
use and purpose of unmanned flying drones. Moving away from simply using the drones for 
target practice, the United States army and air force wanted the pilotless flying vehicles to be 
used for reconnaissance purposes to spy on their enemies.19 In many ways, the reconnaissance 
drones that were built during this time period were similar to their eventual successors, 
weaponized drones, however, they had a vee tail and were about twice as heavy.20 Furthermore, 
several models, such as the Ryan Model 147 Lighting Bug in 195321 and the Aerojet-General 
MQM-58 Overseer in 1964, were successfully converted to reconnaissance drones, and were 
used by the United States army to spy and gather information on as many countries as the USSR, 
North Vietnam, Communist China, and North Korea throughout the 1960s and 1970s.22 This is 
an essential development in the history of pilotless flying drones, because the desire for pilotless 
flying drones was born from fears of human pilots being captured or shot down while conducting 
intelligence missions over hostile territories; a fear which was realized in the infamous case of 
U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers, who was shot down and captured while flying over the USSR. 
Historian John Regianle points out, “The U-2 Incident left the Americans humiliated politically 
and technologically. . . with the Soviets now able to bring down the high flying spy planes, the 
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West had to turn to other means of intelligence gathering.23” When weighing the military options 
and the human security risks, and considering geopolitical strategic interests, the US government 
concluded that it is better to have an unmanned aircraft fly over hostile enemy zones than it is for 
manned aircraft to, granted the unmanned aircraft is sophisticated enough to conduct its missions 
without being noticed by the enemy. This became a key proponent in the logic for using 
unmanned reconnaissance aircrafts to gather information; and as unmanned aircrafts themselves 
developed into attack drones, proponents of this argument would be applied in the modern era to 
justify weaponized drone strikes. 
 
2.4 Attack Drones 
The modern era24 brought with it many dramatic changes to the application and 
construction of pilotless flying aircraft, but perhaps most noteworthy, it began the transition from 
strictly flying reconnaissance vehicles to fully militarized drones. One of the first jet-propelled 
targets, and one of the most widespread unmanned flying aircrafts ever used for reconnaissance 
but capable of firing fatal missiles, is the Teledyne-Ryan Firebee, or the BQM-34A.25 Although 
production ended in 1982, the production line was reopened in 1986 and would continue to 
develop all the way into the 1990s. The Firebee is a simple, reliable and somewhat sophisticated 
target vehicle that has the capability to fire heat-seeking missiles aimed from the wingtips, and, 
although it is rarely used in the field of battle, has proven remarkably successful in intelligence 
gathering missions.26 Indeed, this particular model is still in operation with the US Navy, it has 
been used by the Canadian Air Force and the Japanese Self-Defense forces, as well as a small 
number supplied to NATO, and thus, is an internationally used drone.27 Despite the initial 
success of the BQM-34A, and the incredible technological sophistication of the vehicle for the 
time, during the end of the 1980’s, the United States government seemed disinterested in further 
pursuing pilotless vehicles. By 1991, the Pentagon was forced to consolidate its UAV research 
into a single Joint Program Office, which had little financial autonomy and virtually no budget.28  
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  Donald, David, pg 959. 
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When the Bosnian wars hit the former Yugoslav peninsula in 1992, where hundreds of 
thousands of lives were lost, in accordance with NATO and UN peacekeeping forces, the US 
government issued a statement pledging continual support to its allies by taking various steps, 
that among them the advancement of reconnaissance drones, or UAVs.29 Because of the 
Congressional budget cuts and the consolidation of the drone program years earlier, the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), who was frustrated at the incoherent and unreliable information it 
was receiving from UAVs flying over Bosnia, was able to circumvent a legal loophole and 
effectively take control of the drone program, a program they would continue to control for the 
next decade.30 As such, by 1995, the inefficiency of the GNAT-750 and the outdated BQM-34A, 
coupled with the CIA’s desire to have more reliable intelligence from more reliable UAVs, gave 
rise to the creation of the infamous Predator Drone, a weapon which would be used in hundreds 
of reconnaissance missions by the CIA and the US government for several years.31 The Predator 
Drone had several important upgrades from the GNAT-750 and the BQM-34A such as a 
“deicing” system, reinforced wings, and a laser guided targeting system;32 all of which would 
play crucial roles in the development of attack drones in the coming years.  
After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the drone program, like United States 
foreign policy, took a dramatic turn. A rather ecstatic Bush administration, at the 
recommendation of the CIA, decided it an important strategic priority to quicken and complete 
the transition from reconnaissance and early predator drones into fully armed and militarized 
drone weapons, which would be capable of remotely firing missiles accurately and repetitively at 
military targets abroad.33 To these ends, the president constructed a secret list of High Value 
Targets (HVTs) that the CIA was authorized to kill by way of targeted drone assassinations; 
further officially transferring the responsibility and jurisdiction of drone strikes away from 
elected officials of the government and to the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States.34 
This relationship between the CIA and the US government is an essential part of the Bush-
Obama drone doctrine; and the results of this relationship were on full display from the first ever 









 Clode, George. "Predator Drone Specifications." Military History Monthly 12 (2012): 1-12.Student Research 
Guide.  
33
 Shaw, Ian. 
34
 ibid; pg. 2. 
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drone strike that occurred near the city of Khost, Afghanistan on February 4, 2002. The CIA 
believed to have intelligence that a man walking down a street, who was surrounded by several 
armed guards, was none other than Osama Bin Laden himself.35 Of course, the man was not Bin 
Laden, nor was he even a high level military target.36 Nonetheless, because Osama was on the 
kill list, and thus had congressional and executive approval, the strike was issued, and the price 
to pay from this faulty information was catastrophic; taking the life of 29 innocent and unarmed 
civilians.37 This event marked for the first time in United States history that a targeted military 
drone was used as an attack weapon in war; for one sovereign state, the United States, flew a 
weapon into another sovereign state, Afghanistan, and proceeded to use this weapon to kill 
innocent and unarmed citizens who, in reality, demonstrated no active hostilities or posed 
imminent threats to the security of the United States.38 These attacks, which mustn’t be mistaken 
as acts of peace, rather understood as acts of war, have been and are continually used by the US 
against sovereign and independent nations; and today, they are being used in states where there is 
not officially declared war. This is dangerous because accountability is limited enough in the 
case of declared war; in an undeclared war, it all but disappears.39 Because the decision to strike 
was made by an entity of the government, its Central Intelligence Agency, a dangerous doctrine 
began to form, a doctrine which would have severe international repercussions, especially with 
strikes being continued in Pakistan,Yemen and Somalia in the years to come. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the evolution of unmanned flying aircrafts stretched over two centuries; 
from remotely fired balloons in the late 19th century to unmanned vehicles like the Kettering 
Bug used by the US army for target practice in the middle of the 20th century, up to intelligence 
and reconnaissance spying aircrafts, such as the Dennymite, through the end of the 20th century, 
all the way to the weaponized attack drones in the early 21st century. The historical relevance of 
the development of attack drones is that it provides a context through which to view present day 
drone strikes, and analyze the applied doctrine. All in all, although the types of flying unmanned 
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aircrafts vary according to the time period they were used, and the specs and capabilities have 
dramatically changed throughout the centuries, one single strain of truth remains constant 
throughout: these are weapons of war. And these weapons of war are now being used to carry out 
extrajudicial assassinations that are “targeted” and “surgical.” What have been the results and 
consequences of these new weapons attacking suspected perpetrators abroad? 
III: Drone Doctrine Applied in Pakistan 
3.0 Introduction 
Before the legality of the doctrine can be considered, or the international nature of the 
attacks can be discussed on a unilateral scale, the attacks that have transpired since 2004 and that 
are continually transpiring, particularly in the independent nation of Pakistan, should first be 
understood. To this point, this section approaches the drone doctrine of the United States in two 
different perspectives: 1) the nation affected, Pakistan, and 2) the nation affecting, the United 
States, and shows that not only have the attacks repeatedly damaged innocent civilians, or non 
combats, in Pakistan, but the drone doctrine applied in Pakistan has been counterproductive for 
the United States. In order to do this, the relationship between the US and Pakistan since its birth 
in 1947 is discussed, noting the progression of the relationship before 9/11, and the relationship 
in a post 9/11 world. It then examines the history of United States drone attacks in Pakistan, and 
outlines, with the best available data, the frequency at which the strikes have been employed. It 
explores the repercussions the strikes have had on the fragile and at times non-existent 
relationship between the two states, the growing unlikelihood of future bilateral diplomatic 
cooperation between the two governments and the human repercussions the application of the 
drone doctrine has on ordinary citizens; physically and psychologically. 
3.1 US-Pakistan Bilateral Relations 
To begin, after the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the new nation, led by its foremost 
founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, sought US financial assistance, and thus reached out to 
US leaders.40 Jinnah told the American government that having an ally in Pakistan was important 
because it was a geostrategic pivot zone and an armed buffer zone between major opposing 
powers.41 The new leader also warned that Soviet involvement in the region would be 
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detrimental to US global interests, and asked the American government for two billion dollars 
worth of aid.42 Although the United States did extend aid to the new country, it was far short of 
what Jinnah had asked, a measly sum of ten million dollars.43 This was an important event in the 
relationship between the two countries because it effectively represents the strained relationship 
between Pakistan and the US; a strain that would follow them through the next century.44  
In the 1950s, relations between the two states officially entered the “alliance” phase after 
India rebuffed the Eisenhower administration's attempt to enter into an anti-communist 
alliance.45 The United States then turned to Pakistan, entering into a mutual defense pact against 
communist aggression.46 However, when the Indo-Pakistani war broke out in 1965, the United 
States cut aid to both belligerents, and this infuriated Islamabad.47 In 1980, nearly 15 years later, 
the two states cooperated in the attempts to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan; yet, because the 
interests for each state were different-the US wanted to fend off a communist advance, while 
Pakistan wanted to thwart an Indian aligned country48-the cooperation in the aftermath of the 
Afghanistan intervention was severely limited.49 The same was the case in the post 9/11 era, in 
Afghanistan again, for as a result of different geopolitical and strategic interests in the area, 
namely that the US wanted to eliminate the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and Pakistan wanted to expel 
Indian influence, contributed to and helped foster future mutual distrust between the two states.50 
Although the United States, in recent years, has given billions of dollars in aid to Pakistan and 
has declared Pakistan a friend in the region,51 according to a recent Pew poll, 74% of Pakistanis 
view the United States as an enemy.52 The true root of this is the unfulfilled expectations of an 
alliance that lacks deep convergence of interests;53 and undoubtedly, the recent drone attacks 
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have contributed to the dislike of the United States.54 In sum, the United States and Pakistan have 
had a strained relationship from its very conception in 1947, and since then, different geopolitical 
and strategic interests between the two countries have left Americans and Pakistanis alike are in 
a state of mutual distrust of each other. And adding to the already complex relationship have 
been the constant drone attacks in Pakistan, which began in 2004. 
3.2 Drone Attacks in Pakistan Since 2004 
In recent years, Pakistan has become the single largest recipient of US drone attacks and 
extrajudicial killings in the world.55 According the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), 
who, due to the United States government’s and the CIA’s attempts to keep drone strike statistics 
confidential and classified,56 is the best available public aggregate database on drone attacks, 
there were 52 CIA issued drone attacks in Pakistan from 2004-2009, which killed 416-599 
people, resulting in as many as 292 civilian deaths and 123 child deaths.57 Since the Obama 
administration took power in early 2009, there has been no stoppage of the policy, in fact, in 
2009 alone, the CIA, under the Obama administration, issued more drone attacks in Pakistan, 53, 
than the Bush administration did in 4 years, 52;58 strikes which left as many as 729 Pakistanis 
were killed, with as many as 207 civilian deaths and 41 child deaths.59 From 2010-2013, the 
drone policy of targeted assassinations and extrajudicial killings continued in Pakistan, with 95 
total drone attacks being issued, leaving an estimated 1,094 Pakistanis dead; 292 civilians and 29 
children.60 In sum, the TBIJ reports, that from June 2004 through mid March 2013, drone strikes 
killed 2,562-3,325 people in Pakistan, of whom 474-881 were civilians, including 176 children61 
According to this data, one thing is clear: US drone strikes have repeatedly occurred in Pakistan; 
and show no sign of slowing in the years to come. 
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The official stance of the US government is that little or no civilian lives are taken from 
drone strikes; and moreover, the US government claims that the strikes are “targeted” and 
“surgical,” and impact only those people who have been classified as high level enemy 
combatants.62 But is this the case? Is what is being officially reported representative of reality? In 
September of 2012, two researchers, one from New York University and one from Stanford 
University, traveled to Pakistan for nine months to complete an in-depth and on the ground case 
study on the effects of drone strikes on local communities; seeking to answer the aforementioned 
questions. The resulting case study, entitled Living Under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to 
Civilians From Drone Practices in Pakistan, is an essential source to anybody seriously 
examining US drone doctrine. The researchers criticize the US drone doctrine by presenting an 
in depth case study that documents the horrific reality for the those who live under drones in 
Pakistan. 
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Firstly, according to the researchers, the effects of drone strikes in Pakistan, includes 
severe damage to infrastructure, immense civilian casualties and what's not reported,63 is that 
they threaten the  sanity and safety entire communities.64 They explain: “Drones hover twenty-
four hours a day over communities in northwest Pakistan, striking homes, vehicles, and public 
spaces without warning. . . Their presence terrorizes men, women and children, giving rise to 
anxiety and psychological trauma among civilian communities.”65 Hence, according to these 
researchers, the Pakistani people who live under drones have a constant worry, from the moment 
they wake up to the moment they go to sleep, that at any moment and without warning, a drone 
may strike them and their loved ones; and they have to live with the fact that they are powerless 
to do anything to protect and/or defend themselves.66 Secondly, the official information that is 
being released to the American public and the international community about the effectiveness of 
drone strikes in Pakistan, namely that the strikes are disrupting and destroying members of Al-
Qaeda with minimal civilian “blowback,”67 is a claim that is far from the truth, the researchers 
argue.68 Moreover, this claim has been indeed reported to be false by several major news outlets, 
academic peer reviewed publications and national newspapers. For instance, Peter Bergen and 
Megan Barun of CNN reported in 2012 that “the number of high level targets killed in drone 
strikes as a percentage of total casualties is extremely low-estimated at just 2%.”69 In addition, 
this report also raises a key point, that is, viewing the effects through just numbers of people who 
are killed from the attacks is not necessarily representative of the complete reality; for there are 
countless number of people who are physiologically affected and induced into living in a state of 
fear who do show up in statistics.70 Moreover, not only are the attacks inefficient, but the 
counterproductivity of drone strikes must be seriously considered as well, namely that the strikes 
facilitate recruitment to violent and non-state armed groups and motivate further violent attacks 
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against the United States. Such points have begun to be raised by many across the academic 
community.71 Indeed, and rather ironically, the New York Times reported in 2012, that “drones 
have replaced Guantanamo as the recruiting tool of choice for militants in Pakistan.”72  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, drone attacks in Pakistan, and the continuation of the attacks through the 
codification of doctrine by the United States government and its Central Intelligence agency, 
have been inefficient, counterproductive, and highly damaging. They are inefficient because they 
kill far more innocent people that pose no imminent threat to the United States than they do high 
level military enemy combatants who have violently attacked the United States. This claim is 
supported by the statics and reporting done by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism. They are 
counterproductive because with each inocent mother, father, daughter and brother killed by a 
drone strike, a sentiment of hate and distrust may grow towards the perpetrator, the United 
States. Thus, rather than discouraging acts of terror against the United States, the United States is 
giving the people its trying to discourage all the more reasons to do exactly the opposite of what 
it wants. This claim is supported by a public survey poll of Pakistani people, in which 74% of the 
people viewed America as an enemy. Finally, they are highly damaging, in two respects. First, 
they destroy houses, roads and grocery stores, obliterate entire areas of land and living spaces, 
and kill innocent people. Second, they inflict huge amounts of suffering that goes beyond 
infrastructure damage and physical death, leaving civilians anxious, scared, and psychologically 
damaged. This claim is supported by a case study done by researchers at Stanford and NYU. If 
the application of the Drone Doctrine has excessively injured and severely killed innocent 
people, then where does the justification, legally, to continue applying the doctrine, come from? 
 
IV. United States Legal Argument Supporting the 
Drone Doctrine 
4.0 Introduction 
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Two things have been established so far in this report: 1) Unmanned flying vehicles have 
dramatically evolved over the past two hundred years, and today, militarized and weaponized 
flying drones are capable of repeatedly and remotely firing lethal missiles which kill targets 
abroad; 2) Since 2002, the US government, in coordination with the CIA, has issued countless 
drone attacks, more than half of which occurring in the independent nation of Pakistan, and, 
when considering US strategic interests and the human consequences of drone strikes for 
Pakistani people, the attacks have been inefficient, counterproductive and highly damaging. 
Moving forward, the US legal justification for the continuation of the strikes will be thoroughly 
described, as so the Drone Doctrine may be understood and, in the second half of this paper, 
clearly compared and analyzed under the principles of international humanitarian law and 
customary international norms, and eventually demonstrated to be inconsistent with these legal 
frameworks. Thus, the immediately following section is primarily descriptive.73 
 
4.1 Self-Defense 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) argues in this report that the president of the United 
States has the authority to respond to the imminent threat posed by Al-Qa’ida and its associated 
forces; that “targeting a member of an enemy force who poses an imminent threat of violent 
attack to the United States is not unlawful. . . it is a lawful act of self-defense.74” Moreover, “a 
lethal operation in a foreign nation would be consistent with international legal principles of 
sovereignty and neutrality75” The United States, argues the DOJ, is presently engaged in an 
armed conflict with Al-Qa’ida and its associated forces,76 and during this armed conflict, and 
necessarily only because of this conflict, the president of the United States has the authority to 
protect the nation because of the inherent right to national self-defense;77 the basis of which, the 
DOJ cites, can be found in the United Nations Charter, article 51, which states: 
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the 
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in 
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at 





It is rather ironic that the DOJ uses this particular article as its basis for justifying the strikes as 
acts of national self defense; for the article clearly states that states do have an inherent right to 
national self defense, but it also states that in the execution of this right, the actions must be 
immediately reported to the Security Council, something the US has clearly neglected. Has the 
US not picked and chosen what parts of the charter to adhere to? Does this not undermine the 
legitimacy and authority of the charter itself?  
Subsequently, the report argues that the “like the imposition of military detention, the use 
of lethal force against such enemy forces is an important incident of war.”79 Moreover, they 
make the claim that military necessity, a key principle in the law of armed conflict and thus 
international humanitarian law, “admits of all destruction of life or limb of armed enemies.”80 
Continually, the DOJ argues that “those who take up arms [against the United States] may be 
targeted at any time.”81 Finally, the DOJ makes it clear that “when a person takes up arms or 
merely dons a uniform as a member of the armed forces, he automatically exposes himself to an 
enemy attack.”82 In sum, the DOJ, in an official United States memorandum justifying the use of 
lethal force on enemy combatants through drone strikes, argues that because the US is currently 
involved in an armed conflict with Al-Qaida, any person who shows active hostilities towards 
the US, or even wears a military uniform, can be targeted and killed by a drone attack that has 
been authorized by the president of the United States; and that this authorization gains its 
legitimacy from the inherent right to national self-defense found in the United Nations Charter, 
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article 51. In other words, a drone attack, according to the DOJ, is an act of national self-defense 
by the United States against the enemy they are presently involved in an armed conflict with. 
4.2 A Non-International Conflict 
It is important to consider the nature of the conflict because there are different applicable 
laws, both internationally and domestically, depending on how the conflict is classified. Hence, 
the fundamental question becomes: what is the nature of this armed conflict? The DOJ describes 
the nature of the armed conflict the United States is currently involved in as “non-
international,83” meaning that it is a conflict between a nation and a transnational non-state actor, 
occurring outside of a nation’s territory, and thus, because it is not a clash between nations,84 any 
US operation would be part of this non-international armed conflict, even if it were to occur 
outside the zone of active hostilities.85 In essence, a drone strike can occur anywhere in the 
world, close to a “hot” zone of hostilities or not,86 so long as reliable information has been 
received that the targeted person targeted is planning to attack the United States. Effectively, 
there are no geographical limits to where a drone strike can occur. This type of armed conflict, 
between a nation and a transnational non-state actor, is a relatively new type of conflict, and like 
such, there is little judicial or other authoritative precedent, that speaks directly to the question of 
the geographic scope of a non-international conflict, argues the DOJ.87 In transition, this does not 
restrict the United States from using deadly force on individuals who are planning active 
hostilities against the US in certain countries; rather, if:  
 
An operation of the kind discussed in this paper were to occur in a location where al-Qaeda or an 
associated force has a significant and organized presence and from which Al-Qaeda or an associated 
force, including its senior operational leaders, plan attacks against US person and interests, the operation 
would be part of the non-international conflict between the United States and Al-Qaida, and thus within the 
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In conclusion, if it is determined, through reliable intelligence, that members of Al-Qaida, 
including high level senior operational leaders, are actively planning to inflict violence on the 
United States, then, because the US in presently engaged in an armed conflict with Al-Qaida, in 
conjunction with the national right to self-defense, it is legally consistent to issue a drone attack 
on members of this group; notwithstanding the geographic location. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 The United States justification for drone attacks abroad hinges on two key principles: the 
national right to self defense, and the non-international nature of the conflict it is currently 
engaged in with Al-Qaida. In other words, according to the DOJ, a drone attack is an act of self 
defense that can occur anywhere in the world at any time if it has been reasonably established 
that a high level member of Al-Qaida is currently planning to violently attack the United States.  
Yet, the weakness of this argument is that it is entirely hypothetical in that it effectively 
argues for the legality and legitimacy of a single drone strike on a high-level senior operational 
leader of Al-Qaida. Because we now have more than a decade of the strikes being issued and 
thus empirical evidence on which we can evaluate the consequences and consider the 
repercussions of all the strikes, not one isolated hypothetical strike, it seems superfluous to 
continue debating whether or not a single strike is or is legal and/or effective, but rather consider 
the evidence, which effectively has become the Bush-Obama Drone Doctrine, and question 
whether or not the doctrine has been consistent with IHL and IHRL norms and the fundamental 
principles of the law of armed conflict. Considering this, if one accepts that a drone attack on a 
foreign citizen in a foreign nation is an act of self-defense, (and not an act of aggression) and the 
location of an individual who poses an imminent threat to the security of the United States has 
reasonably been established, the issuing of a drone attack on that individual would seem to be in 
the scope of war and thus consistent with the laws of war. But when considering the human 
consequences of drone attacks and the immense damage that has already been caused by the 
drone doctrine, can the doctrine, when considered as a whole, still be legitimate under the 
principles of international humanitarian law and customary law? 
 
V. Drone Doctrine Under International Law 
5.0 Introduction 
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 Several things have been established in the course of this paper: the history and evolution 
of pilotless flying vehicles began two centuries ago and evolved into present day attack drones, 
these drones have been used for attacks issued by the CIA in accordance with the US 
government and taken the lives of thousands of innocent civilians in the sovereign nation of 
Pakistan and have further weakened the fragile relationship between the two states, and the 
United States Department of Justice argues that the drone attacks are legal acts of national self 
defense against a transnational non-state group with whom it is presently engaged in an armed 
conflict. Moving forward, the drone doctrine will be considered under international law. In order 
to do this, terms must be defined, namely an armed conflict and the nature of the conflict. This 
will help to determine what international laws and principles are applicable to the drone doctrine, 
and allows for a lens by which the drone doctrine can be examined under. 
5.1 Terms Defined 
 International Humanitarian Law is the branch of public international law which regulates 
armed conflict by protecting those who are not directly taking place in hostilities and limits the 
method and means of warfare.89 The fundamental question then is the US currently engaged in 
an armed conflict according to the international community and thus subject to IHL and 
customary norms of IL?  
 The United States government,90 congress,91 and courts92 consider the global war on 
terror an armed conflict; and that has already been established. But what acts of violence 
constitute an armed conflict in the eyes of the international community?  It is clear that acts of 
isolated violence, such as rioting or acts of banditry, do not cross the threshold for an armed 
conflict.93 Therefore, for violence to qualify as an armed conflict, the attacks should not be 
sporadic or isolated, but protracted. In order for protracted violence to exist, and thus an armed 
conflict to exist, the violence must cause significant number of deaths.94 Although not all across 
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the academic community view the US global war on terror to be a legitimate armed conflict,95 
this is clear: the US targeted drone killings have been conducted over a period of time and 
carried out in a systematic way,96 and US targeted drone kills have been issued by the CIA, an 
entity, and thus a representative, of the US government.97 Moreover, the United Nations security 
council’s categorisation of the September 11 attacks as a “threat to peace” indicated to the 
international community that the global war on terror is intense and qualifies as an armed 
conflict;98 therefore internationally classifying the war on terror as an armed conflict and 
justifying the existence of US drone doctrine. Thus, both domestic and international authorities 
consider the US to be presently engaged in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda and its associated 
forces,99 making the conflict not only legitimate, but making it, and the weapons used in it, 
subject to the basic principles of the law of armed conflict-a branch of international humanitarian 
law. 
 
5.2 The Principles of Law of Armed Conflict 
As it has been determined that the United States is presently engaged in an armed 
conflict, international humanitarian law, namely the law of armed conflict, is indeed necessarily 
applicable. There are several principles that govern the law of armed conflict, that are oftentimes 
referred to as the backbone of IHL.100 The purpose of this section is to outline these four basic 
principles, and consider how the use of drones during this conflict, not individual, hypothetical 
drone attacks, has adhered to or has violated these basic principles. Once again, it is essential to 
note that these principles are not hypothetically considered, but through empirical data, reflective 
of actual past realities, and thus considered in light of such evidence. 
 
5.2.1 Military Necessity 
The first principle to be considered is military necessity. This principle effectively 
permits a state engaged in an armed conflict to use only that degree and kind of force, not 
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otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, that is required in order to achieve the 
legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely the complete or partial submission of the enemy at the 
earliest possible moment with the minimum expenditure of life and resources.101 This principle is 
not a new concept102 and has its roots in the Lieber Code article 14 which states that it is legal for 
a party to a conflict to use “those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of war, 
and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.”103 It has been argued that 
in times of emergency, in times of crisis, a leader of an armed force or an individual within an 
armed force could depart from the laws of war if it was essential for victory,104 however this 
argument is now obsolete, for it is clear, that the means to achieve military victory are not 
unlimited.105  
Has the US drone doctrine adhered to the principle of military necessity? A reasonable 
argument may be made that drone strikes, coupled with the counterterrorism efforts from the 
United States, have in fact led to the partial submission of Al-Qaeda, for it is true that in recent 
years Al-Qaeda and the threat of terrorism have been significantly decreased.106 That being said, 
this did not occur with the minimum expenditure of life (when we consider human casualties just 
in the case of Pakistan since the drone strikes began in 2004, or the estimated 225,000 total 
casualties since the war on terror began107) or of resources (the war on terror has cost the United 
States 4 trillion dollars108). However, more specifically, in accordance with the principle of 
military necessity, it may be argued that the drone doctrine was needed to fight the war on terror, 
and maybe, even perhaps, helped the United States win the war on terror. Yet, at what cost? 
Even if it is said that the war on terror is winding down, the cost of the war, both human and 
fiscal, was far too high,109 and although Barack Obama has officially ended the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for his peaceful politics, has in fact not ended 
the war on terror, and his weapon of choice, is and has been the attack drone.  
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The second principle to be considered is the principle of humanity. This principle 
effectively forbids the infliction of suffering, injury or destruction not actually necessary for the 
accomplishment of legitimate military purposes.110 The principle of humanity is based on the 
notion that once a military purpose is achieved, the further infliction of suffering is 
unnecessary.111 This principle protects civilians by confirming the basic immunity of civilian 
objects and civilian populations because civilians and civilian objects make no direct 
contribution to war.112 In other words, once a military purpose has been achieved, such as putting 
a combatant out of action, the infliction of further suffering by attacking him further is prohibited 
by the concept of humanity.113  
This is particularly hard to take into context in its relation to the war on terror, because of 
the very nature of the war, namely its opponent. Terrorism can never be completely eliminated 
from society, it has always existed and it always will, the most one can do is diminish its 
occurrences.114 Essentially, one can always make the argument, and always have a somewhat 
valid point, that continuing drone strikes and the drone doctrine itself is necessary for the 
accomplishment of eliminating terrorism, a legitimate military purpose. Yet, one thing remains 
clear, even a legitimate military purpose, such as this apparent terrorist genocide the US is 
undertaking, can never justify severe civilian casualties or a departure from the law. It is, 
however, important to note, that this principle nor IHL itself sees some sort of utopian world 
where civilians aren’t impacted by war; indeed the mark of war is that it affects all in a society, 
guilty or innocent, armed or unarmed.115 Yet as it has been clearly discussed in a previous 
section, the continuation of suffering on local communities, namely the infliction of severe 
psychological suffering, resulting from continuing drone attacks, does nothing to accomplish the 
legitimate military purposes of the United States. In fact, if anything, by fostering an attitude of 
hate for the United States, it does the opposite.116 In sum, the drone doctrine has indeed proven to 
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inflict unnecessary destruction, injury and suffering on civilians who are not military combatants, 
and thus, in turn, has not adhered to the principle of humanity. 
 
5.2.3 Distinction 
The third principle to be considered in this section is that of distinction. This principle is 
another mechanism that protects civilians, for as military operations are only conducted against 
the enemies armed forces, there must be a clear distinction between the armed forces and 
civilians,117 or between combatants and noncombatants.118 This principle is only logical, and 
basically argues, that because civilians do not take a direct part in hostilities, and, so long as they 
refrain from doing so, they are protected from attack.119 An important point of this principle has 
to do with intelligence and with information.120 Namely, that this obligation to distinguish 
between civilians and combatants is dependent on the quality of the information available to the 
commander at the time he makes the decisions.121 As such, if the person in charge of issuing the 
attack receives information, reviews it honestly and without discrimination, and concludes, with 
all the intelligence available to him, that he is attacking a legitimate military target, then he does 
not automatically violate the principle of distinction.122 Therefore, the principle of distinction 
demands a protection of civilians and an obligation of commanders to clearly distinguish 
between a legitimate military target, a combatant and civilians, or noncombatants.123 But, if this 
principle is adhered to and a drone attack is issued, like the attack on Khost, Afghanistan in 
2002, and then afterwards it is clearly shown to be absent distinction because the attack ends up 
killing civilians and/or civilian objects, where does the fault lie? Surely, if this principle is only 
considered before the attack is issued, and thus, on a hypothetical level, then one can make the 
argument that because of the technological sophistication of drones and the weapons they have, a 
single drone attack is actually more discriminatory than other means of warfare.124 However, this 
paper is not considering a single, hypothetical drone attack, it is considering the drone doctrine 
on the whole, and the compilation of the attacks, when taken together, and when considered with 
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the best available empirical evidence,125 the fact that the drone doctrine has indeed not been 
discriminatory to citizens becomes clear. 
 
5.2.4 Proportionality  
Finally, the last principle to be discussed in this section that is a key proponent in the law 
of armed conflict is the principle of proportionality. This principle requires that the losses 
resulting from a military action should not be excessive in relation to the expected military 
advantage.126 This principle of proportionality first appeared in Additional Protocol I, which 
states “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is strictly prohibited.”127 In 
essence, if a drone attack does more damage to civilians who are not actively engaged in combat 
than it accomplishes the military objective of the conflict as a whole, the attack is in violation of 
the principle of proportionality. As such, it has been demonstrated through empirical data that 
drone attacks in the nation of Pakistan have done far more damage to civilians and civilian 
objects than they have damaged military targets,128 and thus, have been in violation of the 
principle of proportionality.  
The expected military advantage can be considered by weighing the different possible 
military options, such as sending in ground troops or flying over the hostile zone with piloted 
aircraft,129 and discerning whether or not the use of a drone, on the area being considered, will do 
more benefit to one's army and one’s strategic interests than it will do harm to the local 
community. This is a difficult thing to balance, for it is not necessarily possible to predict the 
future, and there will always be “blowback” and loss of civilian life, as well as many other 
variables at play that one could not possibly know before hand. So why leave the issuing of a 
drone attack to predictive events in the future that are all but impossible to know? Why not 
instead use the data from drone attacks already issued as a guidepost for predicting future 
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attacks? For if this data was considered, then drones would be used sparingly, and with great 
hesitation, for the past has taught us that with each drone strike that is issued, a disproportionate 
amount of civilians will be affected. 
 
5.3 IHRL Norms and Customary Law 
 One of the most basic IHRL and IHL norms that enjoys the status of customary 
international law is the right to life.130 This right is protected on the international level131 the 
regional level132 and the national level.133 The right to life is thus not only a fundamental human 
right, but a deeply held right that is protected in times of peace and war.134 In transition, life can 
not be taken by arbitrary means, nor can it be taken inappropriately, unjustly, or with a lack of 
predictability; and any life that is taken by these means is strictly prohibited under IHRL and 
IHL customary law.135 The ICRC confirms the protection of this right to life, and notes that 
given the obvious risk to life during an armed conflict, a great deal of IHL is dedicated to 
protecting the right to life, thus having a reinforcing, if not beneficial, effect on the right to life 
itself.136 The issue of targeted killings was considered by the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee in its review of a report submitted by Israel. The committee was very explicit and 
clear: 
 
The State Party should not use ‘‘targeted killings’’ as a deterrent or punishment. The State party should 
ensure that the utmost consideration is given to the principle of proportionality in all its responses to 
terrorist threats and activities. State policy in this respect should be spelled out clearly in guidelines to 
regional military commanders, and complaints about disproportionate use of force should be investigated 
promptly by an independent body. Before resorting to the use of deadly force, all measures to arrest a 
person suspected of being in the process of committing acts of terror must be exhausted.
137
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This is an important statement to consider, for it recognizes the fundamental right to life and 
reaffirms the international communities protection of it, by insuring that not only are strikes to be 
proportionate, but issued only as a last resort. Consequently, the question becomes: has the drone 
doctrine of the United States respected the internationally held right to life by taking life non-
arbitrarily, appropriately, justly and predictably?  
Life is taken arbitrarily when due process is not 
followed and when it is not done in terms sanctioned by the law.138 This right to due process and 
a fair trial, which together are included with the right to life, is in line with IHRL norms.139 Yet, 
when an individual is merely suspected of being a terrorist, and suspected to be actively planning 
hostilities against the United States, and then targeted and killed by a drone, has not this right to 
due process of law been undermined? Granted, there are situations where due process may be 
impossible, and thus, circumstances where life may be taken arbitrarily but still remain in the 
confides of the law.140 These circumstances are where state agents kill in order to preserve the 
rights of others; and are essentially taking life in order to protect life. But even these 
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circumstances are strictly regulated by IHRL and IHL norms.141 For instance, the individuals life 
that is being taken must pose an immediate threat to the life of others therefore making his 
elimination an absolute necessity; and in order for it to be lawfully considered a necessity for his 
life to be taken, the threat should be “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, 
and no moment of deliberation.142” Considering this, it becomes clear that the main purpose of 
the IHRL framework which guarantees the right to life is to strictly monitor and review any use 
of force whose sole purpose is to deprive life and make sure it is within the confides of the 
law. 143  When the right to a fair trial is sacrificed for the greater good and the immediate 
protection of life, and thus an individual is determined guilty without due process or a fair trial, 
and is targeted by a US drone, a legitimate argument may be made that this individual, if he 
poses an instant, overwhelming and immediate threat to the security and safety of others, can be 
lawfully targeted and killed. There still is debate within the academic community as to the 
legitimacy of this argument, and has even been disputed by some.144 Yet, even if we accept that 
in certain circumstances an individual may lose his right to due process and his most 
fundamental right to life if his existence poses an immediate threat to the life of others, if the 
means of killing this individual, namely a drone attack, has been empirically proven to take a 
disproportionate amount of civilian life in the attack, then the loss of life and forfeiting of the 
right to life for civilians that results from a drone attack cannot be reasonably remain within the 
scope of the law. In sum the right to life is strictly prohibited from being taken arbitrarily, and 
considering the sheer amount of lives that have been taken arbitrarily in drone attacks in Pakistan 
since 2004,145 the drone doctrine has not respected the internationally held right to life by taking 
lives arbitrarily, and for this reason, among others, must be revisited, reviewed, and readjusted.  
 
VI: Conclusions 
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The Bush-Obama drone doctrine has been defined as the use of attack drones to 
extrajudicially target and kill suspected or known high level members of terrorist organization 
Al-Qaeda; irrespective of their geographic location. The United States has applied this doctrine 
in as many countries as Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan since 2001; and three 
important lessons have been noted from their use, and mustn’t be overlooked. These should be 
taken into consideration as the United States contemplates the use of drones as weapons in war in 
other countries in the future. Firstly, they are inefficient, and thus, disproportionate, because they 




Secondly, they are counterproductive to US military and strategic interests. And thirdly, the US 
drone doctrine as applied in Pakistan has been highly damaging, to infrastructure and to civilians, 
and has induced many in Pakistan into a distrust of the US and caused them to live in a state of 
fear. These three lessons have been learned from Pakistan through research done in a case study 
and an analysis of that case study, and by compiling empirical evidence to support these claims. 
In sum, the lessons learned from Pakistan should be a way to move forward and amend the 
doctrine; for perhaps in the early years of this policy, the continuation could be excused, for it 
was a brand new, and a rather exciting idea. However, now that we have 11 years of empirical 
evidence that clearly allows us to see the effects of drone doctrine as it has been applied, there 
can be no more excuses for unwarranted injury and trauma being inflicted on innocent people all 
over the world, and especially in Pakistan.  
 Realistically, adjusting and amending this doctrine in the future will not be easy. Yet, it is 
presently important to consider the strengths and weaknesses of continuously using attack drones 
34 
in the field of war. There are undeniable strengths in using drones, that include, but are not 
limited to: a projection of power, lower risk to US military personnel, more precise than other 
weapons, technologically sophisticated, and hypothetically consistent with the laws of war and 
the principles of the law of armed conflict. These strengths are what make the use of drones so 
appealing to the US. Realizing this, it is only a matter of time until other countries in the world 
develop this technology, and that is why it is so important to consider the effects of these 
weapons as they have already been used by the US through careful consideration of empirical 
evidence, so that precedents that are consistent with the rule of law and protective of civilians are 
set; both internationally and domestically.  
Indeed, that is the importance of this topic, for as the world becomes more 
technologically advanced, the nature of war will continue to change, and the weapons used in 
war will continue to change. There is somewhat of a consensus across the academic community 
that war and its weapons are becoming more robotic and automated, and as attack drones are 
really the first weapon of its kind, they are just the tip of the iceberg. Yet, as the nature of war 
will undoubtedly change, and the weapons used in war will inevitably change, the basic 
principles of law and the rights they guarantee, they cannot change. We must understand the 
sophistication of this weapon, and realize its differences to older and traditional weapons, but not 
lose sight of the rule of law, and the people the law and the adherence to it protects. Noting this, 
we must understand the weaknesses of the drone doctrine and the use of drones, that include, but 
are not limited to: more damaging to non targeted people than targeted people, counterproductive 
to US interests, limited accountability for resulting damage, empirically inconsistent with 
principles and norms of international law, no due process of law or fair trial for those targeted 
and killed, and the undermining of the rule of law. Thus, noting these distressing realities, there 
are several steps the US can take, as well as the international community, to readjust the 
doctrine, and set a precedent for the use of drones and weapons like them in the future.  
 First of all, the US must be more accountable. One of the fundamental steps to good 
governance and to progress itself is accountability, and how does a government be accountable? 
By being transparent. Thus, the US government should release their official information of the 
effects and usages of drones, and transfer back responsibility from the CIA, an agency who 
infamously works in covert and secretive ways, and back to the US government, and thus, the 
people of the US, entirely. Second of all, the US should respect and observe IHRL norms and 
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IHL principles in its struggle against terrorism by being thorough in gathering information on 
which decisions to target are made and targeting only individuals who are legitimate targets in 
terms of the law. Moreover, this requires that the US distinguish civilians from legitimate targets 
in a way that is more empirically acceptable and that severely limits the collateral damage, 
making it acceptable to the principle of proportionality. Finally, the international community, 
specifically the United Nations and international organizations such as the United Nations High 
Commission on Human Rights and the International Committee on the Red Cross, should 
continue to censure and discourage the manner in which the US is conducting it use of drones. 
Like such, these organizations should call on the US to release its official data on the use of 
drones to the international community, and thus, be more accountable to the international 
community. After all, the drone doctrine is an international policy, and has repercussions on the 
whole of the international community, so not only is there domestic action that must be taken to 
improve the doctrine, but perhaps more importantly, there is international action that must be 
taken and conceivably without which any further improvement to the policy would not be 
possible. All in all, it is a dangerous thing for the US to continue playing judge, jury and 
executioner, and if the international community does not take notice soon, the Bush-Obama 
Drone Doctrine will continue to be used and codified in the coming years; and the lessons 
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